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Macroeconc-mic  Adjustment
and  Growth
If developing countries follow the same paths  years of high reproductive rates reaches adult-
industrialized countries have followed, saving  hood, the proportion of working-age population
for retirement will initially become more impor-  rises sharply. Then, as baby boomers retire and
tant as the population growth rate declines.  die off, it declines toward the steady-state level.
To calculate the potential importance of life-  Webb and Zia simulated aggregate rates for
cycle saving (saving for retirement), Webb and  life-cycle savings for Brazil, China, Korea,
Zia set up a simulation model that translates  Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, and Turkey.
demographic projections into savings-rate
projections. Modeling explicitly the behavior of  The savings rates increase 5 or 6 percentage
each cohort of households separates the effects  points when the last baby boomers enter the
of changing population shares of children and  work force and begin to save after their children
retirees.  These shares behave differently and  leave home. The effect on life-cycle saving is
have different effects on saving as the popula-  dramatic; the effect on total savings rates, which
tion growth rate changes.  are often three or four times as high, is not.
Baseline World Bank population projections  Simulated life-cycle savings rates peak at an
assume that by the middle of the twenty-first  absolute 10 percent or less in all cases.  The
century, if not sooner, the net reproductive rate  pattems in these projections seem robust with
of women in every country will decline to 1.0,  a  regard to assumptions about productivity
level that will eventually lead to a stable popula-  growth, interest rates, and age-specific participa-
tion.  As the last cohort of those born in the  tion in the labor force.
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Rapid  population  growth  in  developing  countries  has  been  a staple
concern  of  economists  for  decades,  but  we also  need  to think  about  what a
slowdown  and  end  to that  growth  will  mean  or  would  mean,  for  the  end  of it is
not  yet  certain. This  note  focuses  on the  implications  for  saving  behavior.
We report  simulations  to see  how  the  projected  demographic  changes  would
affect  aggregate  saving  behavior  for  the  life-cycle,  consumption-smoothing
motive. Our results  imply  that  the  demographic  transitions,  projected  by
demographers  at the  Bank  and  elsewhere,  would  increase  aggregate  saving  in
developing  countries  by around  5  percentage  points  of  GDP.  The  timing  of this
saving  increase  depends,  of course,  on the  timing  of  the  demographic
transition,  but the  sizes  of the  projected  saving  changes  are  remarkably
similar  across  countries. These  increases  of saving  are  large  enough  to  have
a significant  impact  on the  per  capita  growth  rate,  although  they  are  smaller
than  the  double-digit  increases  of saving  rates  in  some  countries  with the
most successful  development  in  the  1980s. The  projections  of saving  rates  are
not intended  in  any  way as forecasts  for  the  individual  countries. They  only
illustrate  what  would  happen  to one  type  of saving  behavior,  namely  household
savings,  in response  to several  variants  of demographic  transitions.2
Many  economists  have  written  on the  effects  of  demography  on saving.
Most  commonly  the  empirical  studies  look  at  dependency  ratios  --  the  share  of
the  population  under  15 or  over  65 --  as one  of the  right-side  variables  in  a
regression  with the  aggregate  saving  rate  on the  left. The  results  vary
according  to the  sample  and  the  choice  of other  explanatory  variables,  but
generally  higher  dependency  ratios  significantly  lower  saving  rates  (Leff
1969,  1971,  1980;  Mason  1987;  Mason  and  Fry  1982;  Lahiri  1988;  Rossi  1989;  see
Hammer  1986  for  a survey). This  empirical  result  is fully  consistent  with the
model  and  simulations  that  follow.
The  contributiun  of this  study  is to  employ  an explicit  model  of life-
cycle  saving  to examine  the  effects  of actual  and  predicted  changes  in
demographic  structure  for  particular  economies.  Explicit  life-cycle  models
have  been  used  to  predict  saving  rates  analytically,  which  has required  the
researcher  to assume  steady-state  populations  (Tobin  1967;  Hammer  1987). Only
with the  numerical  simulation  procedures  used  here is it  feasible  to examine
in  detail  the  effects  of the  great  deviations  from  steady-state  that  occur
during  demographic  transitions.  In  the  simulations  shown  below,  the  greatest
fluctuations  of saving  rates  occur  when the  population  systems  deviate
farthest  from  steady-state.
Demographic  Proiections
Demographic  forecasters  predict  hopefully  that  by the  middle  of the  next
century  all  the  developing  countries  will  have  begun  phase  two  of their
demographic  transitions,  in  which  net  reproductive  rates  (NRR)  fall  to  1.
(The  NRR  is the  number  of female  children  per  woman  that  survive  to
childbearing  age.)  Eventually,  this  will cause  aggregate  birth  rates  to3
decline  to equal  death  rates,  but  that  will  take  many  decades  because  previous
population  growth  makes  the  share  of  women  in  childbearing  age  higher  than  .he
steady-state  share. In South  Korea,  for  instance,  the  NRR  is now  one,  but  the
crude  birth  rate  is  over  one  percent  above  the  crude  death  rate. If the  NRR
stays  at 1.0,  the  birth  rate  will not  equal  the  death  until  the  22nd  century.
In  many  countries  of Europe,  North  America,  and  East  Asia the  net  reproductive
rates  have  already  declined  to  near  1.0  or  lower,  and  in  most  Latin  American
countries  the  declines  are  clearly  underway. In  most  of sub-Saharan  Africa
and  a few  other  places,  on the  other  hand,  the  decline  of  net reproductive
rates  has  not  started  and  is  projected  mainly  on the  basis  of extrapolation
from  other  regions  and  of hope  for  declines  in  birthrates  before  dramatic
increases  of death  rates  become  unavoidable.
T,,e  demaographic  transitions  in  the  developing  countries  promise  to  be
even  more  dramatic  than  those  that  took  place  over  the  past  century  in  Europe
and  North  America,  because  the  birthrates  have  been  higher  absolutely  and
relative  to the  death  rates. The  age  composition  of the  population  in
developing  countries  will  change  dramatically. In  most  developing  countries,
40  to 50  percent  of the  population  is  currently  under  the  age  of 15,  and  less
than  5  percent  is  65 or  older. In the  projected  demographic  steady  states,
with birth  rates  at replacement  rates,  those  under  15  will be less  than  20
percent  of the  population  and  those  over  65  will  be over  10 percent. In
between  the  current  situation  and  the  zero-population-growth  (ZPG)  steady
states,  countries  pass  through  a phase  where  the  share  of children  has fallen
but  the  share  of the  old  has  not  yet  risen  as  much.  The  industrial  countries
are  currently  in that  phase,  and  most of them  have  increased  their  saving
rates,  arguably  in  anticipation  of sharp  (further)  increases  of the  share  of4
elderly.
Figure  1A shows  the  population  profiles  for  Brazil,  Nigeria.  and  Japan
in  1985,  and  the  projected  profiles  for  3razil  in 2030,  Nigeria  in  2055,  and
both  Brazil  and  Nigeria  in  2100 (Figure  1B). Notice  how  the  projected
profiles  for  Brazil  and  Nigeria  in the  next  century  (when  their  simulated
saving  rates  turn  out  to  be highest)  resemble  that  of  Japan  today.
Life-Cycle  SavinR
There  are  several  important  motives  for  saving  that  are related  to
demographic  variables. This  study  focuses  on saving  to  provide  for  one's  old
age,  commonly  referred  to as life-cycle  saving. During  their  working  years,
the  story  goes,  people  save  enough  so that  they  can sustain  steady  consumption
after  retirement  by buying  an annuity  or living  off  the  principal  and  interest
of their  investments.  A later  section  discusses  the  details  of modelling  such
behavior. Intuitively,  one  can  see  how  a demographic  transition  will affect
aggregate  saving  for  life-cycle  motives. If people  do  most of  the saving  for
thei.  old  age in  the  working  years  after  their  children  leave  home,  the
economy's  saving  rate  will rise  when  the  cohorts  that  started  having  fewer
children  per  woman (low-birth  cohorts)  reach  the  high-saving  years. Prior  to
that  time,  the  share  of  households  in  the  high-saving  age  is small,  leading  to
a low  aggregate  saving  rate. Saving  rates  for  the  life-cycle  motive  peak  when
the  first  of the  low-birth  cohorts  goes  through  the  high-saving  age,  because
the  share  of  older  people  (negative  savers)  in  the  population  is still  small.
Then  the  aggregate  saving  rates  decline  again  somewhat,  to the  ZPG  steady
state,  as the  low-birth  cohorts  retire,  raising  the  shara  of  households  that
are  negative  savers. This  note  focuses  on the  life-cycle  motive  because  that
motive  is  most likely  to  produce  a dramatic  shift  in saving  as a result  of the5
projected  declines  in  birth  rates.
Motives  for  saving  would  prc.a)bly  change  during  the  demographic
transition.  The  experience  of the  idustrial  countries  suggests  that  saving
for  housing,  consumer  durables,  and  education  become  more important  during  the
transition.  Let  us consider  briefly  some  of these  influences  on saving,  which
act  along  side  the  life-cycle  motives  for  saving. (See  Gersovitz  1987  for  a
survey.j The  direction  of causation  of the  demographic  transition  and  non-
life-cycle  savings  motives  is  not  clear  and  is  probably  not  in a single
direction. Furthermore,  the  nature  of  households  change  during  the
transition.
Many  people  in developing  countries  today  live  in  extended  households
that  last  beyond  the  lives  of those  in  them,  and  probably  most adults  in them
expect  to rely  mainly  on their  children  for  support  when  they  reach  old  age.
Thus  actual  saving  for  life-.-icle  motives  would  be lower  today  than  in  our
simulations.  With  non-negative  rates  of  population  growth  and  interest,  life-
cycle  saving  rates  for  extended  households  would  be lower  than  for  the
nuclear,  mortal  households  (Gersovitz  1987). Parents  who  could  expect  to
share  in the  earnings  of their  children  would  save  less  for  their  old  age  than
parents  who  could  not.  In  Gary  Becker  style  home  economics,  parents  who
invest  more in  children  as earning  assets  would  invest  less  in  financial
assets. The  Bank's  assumption  that  all  countries  will  make the  transition  to
stable  populations  with low  rates  of  birth  and  death  seems  to imply  an
accompanying  transition  to  nuclear  households,  since  that  is  what  has
predominated  in  the industrial  economies  that  have  already  made the  transition
to stable  populations. Furthermore,  if  average  net reproductive  rates  sink  to
1.0,  a large  fraction  of the  adults  would  face  the  substantial  probability,  if6
not  the  certainty,  of  having  no working  children  that  could  help  support  them
after  retirement.  Other  forms  of  old-age  security  would  have to  become  the
norm.
Besides  the  life-cycle  motive,  people  might  also  save  to  make  bequests
at or  near their  death,  to  pay  for  their  children's  education,  to  accumulate
assets  to  purchase  consumer  durables  (including  housing),  or to take  advantage
of  market  returns  in  excess  of their  rate  of time  preference.
The  bequest  motive  for  saving  would  initially  reinforce  the  life-cycle
motive's  effect  of increasing  aggregate  saving  during  the  demographic
transition,  because  people  would  save  for  bequests  also  during  the  later
working  years.  (As  discussed  later,  for  the  purpose  of smoothing  per  capita
consumption  over  the  life-cycle,  parents  would  concentrate  saving  in  the  years
after  children  leave  home.) Determining  the  effect  of bequests  in  the  steady
state  would  be complicated,  however,  by their  effect  on the  behavior  of
households  that  receive  them. In the  initial  condition  of  most  developing
countries  it seems  unlikely  that  inherited  wealth  (except  land)  would  play  a
major  role  in  consumption  decisions  of  most  households.  Saving  for  bequests
would  increase  the  peak  in  the  saving  rates  caused  by the  life-cycle  motive,
but later  its  effects  would  be  mixed  as the  economy  moved  toward  the  steady
state: retirees  would  dissave  less,  in  order  to  preserve  a legacy  to
bequeath,  but  with a slight  delay  working  households  would  need  to save  less
for  their  retirement  as they  started  to receive  larger  inheritances  because
they  had fewer  siblings.
Parents'  (or  grandparents')  saving  ahead  for  the  education  of children
(already  born)  would follow  a predictable  path  through  the  demographic
transition,  if the  strength  of  the  education-of-children  motive  for  saving7
stayed  constant. Saving  for  education  would  rise  then  fall  along  with the
share  of children  in  the  population.  Fluctuations  in aggregate  saving  for
education  would in such  a  case  tend  to offset  the  changes  of life-cycle  saving
during  the  demographic  transition.  On the  other  hand,  if the  education  motive
for  saving  strengthens  as the  children  per  household  declines,  then  changes  in
saving  for  education  would  reinforce  the  changes  in life-cycle  saving. (See
also  Drazen,  1978.)
Saving  for  consumer  durables  motivates  saving  during  the  earlier  years
of a  household's  life,  in  the  years  with  non-working  children. More  uniform
saving  over  the  life  of a  household  would  reduce  any  impact  of the  demographic
transition  on aggregate  saving,  since  households  would  save  at  more  nearly
uniform  rates  over  the  working  years,  and  the  changing  relative  size  of age
cohorts  would  make less  difference.  Because  of the  high  per-capita-income
elasticity  of demand  for  consumer  durables,  however,  the  demographic
transition  could  still  have  a  net  positive  effect  on  aggregate  saving  for
consumer  durables. Fewer  children  would  raise  per  capita  income  and  thus
raise  the  demand  and  saving  for  consumer  durables  and  children's  education.
In other  words,  when  DINKs  (couples  with  Double  Incomes  and  No Kids),  which
are  now rare  in  LDCs,  become  common  (that's  what the  demographic  transition
means),  they  may  behave  like  DINKs  in  industrial  countries  and  save  more for
new  cars  and  video  equipment.
The  demographic  transition  will  not  have  a strong  or clearly  predictable
impact  on saving  for  motives  other  than  life-cycle.  With  that  in  mind let  us
turn  to the  simulations,  which  aims  to provide  quantitative  estimates  of  how
much  aggregate  life-cycle  saving  will  change  during  the  demographic
transition.8
A Simulation  Model  for  Household  Saving
Households  are  the  behavioral  units  of  the  model  here. Therefore,  first
step  is  to construct  a  picture  over  time  of the  demographic  composition  of the
typical  household  in  each  cohort  (those  started  in a 5  year  period,  or
pentad). The  Population,  Health,  and  Nutrition  Division  (PHRHN)  has  detailed
demograpnic  projections  from  which  one  can  infer  what typical  households  will
look  like  for  the  next  couple  of centuries,  given  the  PHRHN  assumptions  out
the  trajectory  of fertility  and  mortality. We assume  that  the  number  or
households  in each  cohort  is the  number  of  women  in  that  cohort  who  have  left
their  parents'  houw  hold.  There  is thus  one  adult  woman  per  household,  and  a
cohort  of households  lasts  as iong  as the  life  expectancy  of  the  women. There
are  as  many  men per  household  of a cohort  as there  are  men  per  women.
Children  enter  the  household  at  birth  and  phase  out  as young  adults.  We used
fertility  rates  for  different  cohorts  of  women  to  allocate  children  of each
cohort  to  the  proper  cohorts  of  households  (of  women).
Households  in the  model  receive  labor  incomie  and  interest  income  from
any  accumulated  saving. The  base-line  interest  rate  is  3  percent  (real).
People  enter  the  work force  starting  at  age  15,  and  they  leave  at 65.
Participation  rates  are  0.8  for  ages  15-19  (for  the  30  percent  of young
persons  that  have  separated  so early  from  their  parents),  0.7  for  20-60,  0.6
for  55-69  and  0.4  for  60-64. Productivity  and  wages  of the  standard  worker
grow  each  year,  3  percent  per  year  in +-,e  base-line  case.  Young  workers  earn
less,  50 percent  of the  standard  for  ages  15-19,  60  percent  for  ages  20-24,
and  80 percent  for  ages  25-29. Teenagers  at  home  were  assumed  to  make  no
income  contribution  to the  household  in  the  base  case. After  the  age  of 30,
all  workers  earn  the  same  amount  in any  given  year,  although  a  worker  will9
earn  more  over  his  lifetime  than  his  father  or older  brother,  because
productivity  growth  makes  the  standard  wage  higher  over  his  lifetime. Because
men and  women  are  merged  within  each  household,  there  is  no point  is
distinguishing  between  their  productivity  or participation  rates.
For  a  given  interest  rate  and  growth  rate  of labor  productivity,  each
household  saves  (and  dissaves)  in  order  to smooth  per  capita  consumption  as
much as  possible. We assume  that  households  start  with zero  net  wealth,  that
households  plan  to have  zero  wealth  when the  parents  die  at the  expected  age
of death  for  their  cohort,  and  that  households  cannot  be net  debtors  in any
period.  Assuming  that  consumption  cannot  exceed  income  for  young  households
is  not  entirely  realistic,  but  it seems  preferable  to the  other  ecually
simplifying  assumption,  namely  that  households  can  borrow  as  much  as they  want
to  smooth  per  capita  consumption  of the  households.  Assuming  no liquidity
constraint  would  lead  households  in  the  simulation  to run  up debt  several
times their annual earnings,  which seems less realistic  than assuming  no debt.
With this  set  of objectives  and  constraints,  households  consume  all
their  income  (all  from  labor)  until  the  parents  reach  their  40s  because,
relative  to the  expectations  for  later  years,  labor  productivity  is low  and
especially  because  the  household  population  per  worker  is  high. The
households  turn  to saving  when the  parents  are  in  their  forties,  early  or late
depending  on  parameters  such  as the  rate  of assumed  labor  productivity  growth
and  the  numbers  of  children. Figure  2 shows  the  path  of income,  consumption
and  wealth  for  a typical  household. An iterative  program  (LOTUS  macro)  tried
different  transition  points  from  saving  to  non-saving  and  different  constant
levels  of constant  per  capita  consumption  after  the  switch  to positive  saving,1G
until  a  consumption  path  was found  that  left  zero  wealth  at  age  75.1  In this
manner  we simulated  the  income,  consumption  and  saving  of each  cohort  of
households,  starting  at the  beginning  of the  20th  century  and  going  out  to the
end  of the  22nd  century. 2 In order  to do the  aggregation  for  any  period,  say
1950-54  or 2085-89,  it  was  necessary  to have  the  income  and  consumption  paths
for  every  cohort  of households  that  existed  in  the  period. 3
To get  the  aggregate  saving  rate  of the  economy  for  each  5-year  period,
we multiplied  the  income  and  consumption  per  household  for  each  cohort  by the
number  of households  (women)  in the  cohort  during  the  period. Then  we added
up the  income  and  consumption  across  households.
Simulation  Results
The  paths  of  consumption  for  households  did  not  change  greatly  over  the
transition.  Most of the  change  in the  aggregate  saving  rate  resulted  from  the
changes  in the  relative  numbers  of  different  age  households.
Figures  3 to 9 show  the  simulated  saving  rates  with  base-case
assumptions  for  Brazil,  China,  S.  Korea,  Mexico,  Nigeria,  Pakistan,  and
Turkey. The  saving  rates  are  all  in  the  range  of 3  to 11  percent,  which  is
1 A  point  of  imprecision  in  the  simulation  is  that  the  wealth  of  households
that die early  just disappears  and is not available  for consumption  by the
survivors.
2  Since  UN  population  data  with  the  requicite  breakdowns  by  age  start  only
in  1950,  we had  to  project  the  earlier  history  of  all  households  that  were  still
existing  in 1950.  This  was necessary  to have simulations  of aggregat2  saving
that  began  in  the  19509.  Without  some  back  projection  we could  not  have  computed
any  aggregate  saving  rates  for  years  before  2010. For  the  pre-1950  projections
we assumed  the  age-specific  death  and  fertility  rates  that  prevailed  in 1950.
Our  results  are  not sensitive  to these  assumptions.
3  The  unit  of income  and  consumption  was the  annual  earnings  of one  full
adult  worker  in the  base  period  (1980-84).11
plausible,  in that  we are  considering  only  household  saving  and  only  for  one
motive.
The  simulated  saving  rates  rise,  as  our  intuition  suggested. The
sharpness  of the  rise  dipends  on the  rapidity  of the  decline  in the  fertility
rate. The  size  of the  rise  is almost  uniformly  5  percentage  points  from  the
1980s  to  the  peak in  the  next  century. The  rises  for  China  and  Mexico  are  the
steepest  and  are  6  percentage  points. They  are  so steep  because  of the  size
of the  recent  and  projected  decline  in the  Net  Reproductive  Rate.  Since  the
changes  took  place  in less  than  one  generation,  the  demographic  structure  and
aggregate  saving  projections  show  an  echo  of  the  transition  long  after  the  NRR
has  stabilized  at 1.0. This  is especially  pronounced  for  China.  (Such
patterns  really  happen;  French  demography  echoes  the  Napoleonic  wars through
the  whole  19th  century). The  timing  of the  rise  in  the  saving  rate  depends  on
the  date  of the  projected  or actual  decline  in fertility.  The  note  to each
figure  indicates  the  date  by  which  the  n-et  reproductivw  rate (NRR)  is assumed
to  reach  1.0.4 In  China  and  Korea,  for  instance,  the  drop  of reproductive
rates  per  woman  to  NRR - 1.0  has already  occurred,  although  population  will
continue  to  grow  for  some  time,  due  to the  increasing  numbers  of  women  of
childbearing  age.  In  Nigeria,  where  the  slowdown  of  births  has  not  begun  and
where  the  population  projection  does  not  assume  a  NRR  of 1.0  until  2035,  the
saving  rate  drifts  down  for  20  more  years  before  turning  upward  and  moving
toward  a  peak in  2050.
4 With  a  net  reproductive  rate  of  1.0,  population  growth  eventually  stops.12
Sensitivity  to Assumptions
The  results  illustrated  in the  base  cases  are  worth  taking  seriously
only  if they  do not  depend  critically  on the  assumptions  used in  the
simulations.  We chose  Brazil  as  a case  to  test  the  results  for  sensitivity  to
the  assumptions  about  the  interest  rate,  productivity  growth  rate,  age  of
entry  of youths  into  the  workforce,  and  age  of retirement.
Since  the  model  is  all in  real  terms,  the  relevant  interest  rate  for
these  long-term  projection  is  presumably  a  positive  rate  less  than  102.  It is
the  real  rate  of return  on  assets  held  by the  household  after  it starts  to
save. Figure  10 shows  the  projected  paths  of saving  rates  wi_Zh  1 and  5
percent  interest,  as  well as 3  percent,  which  is  the  base  case (also  shown  in
Figure  3).  With the  life-cycle  saving  motive,  the  interest  rate  changes  have
only  an income  effect,  which  is  small,  lowering  the  saving  rate  by less  than  a
percentage  point  for  each  percentage  point  rise  of the  interest  rate  rises.
Changing  the  interest  rate  does  not affect  the  projected  pattern  of the
response  of the saving  rate  to the  demographic  transition.
The  growth  rate  of labor  productivity  makes  little  difference  for  the
aggregate  saving  rate  in  the  early  years,  and  there  is  never  much  difference
between  aggregate  saving  rates  with  3  percent  and  6  percent  annual
productivity  growth. With  zero  productivity  growth,  however,  simulated
aggregated  saving  drops  sharply  as the  demography  moves  toward  the  steady
state. The  impact  of slow  productivity  growth  is  distant  but  it  does  convey
some  intuition  about  the  relation  of productivity  and life-cycle  saving. When
productivity  is  growing,  the  aggregate  impact  of dissaving  of retirees  is
mitigated  by the  growth  in labor  income  of  younger  cohorts. With 6  percent
productivity  growth,  retirees  in their  70s  are  enjoying  a life-style  (paid  for13
out  of saving)  that  is  only  about  half  as  expensive  as the  life-style  (and
saving)  of those  still  working. With  no productivity  increase,  on the  other
hand,  the  dissaving  retirees  weighs  heavier  on the  economy. Obviously,  this
effect  is  unimpurtant  before  the  time  when retirees  are  a large  share  of the
population.  Figure  11 shows  the  projections  for  Brazil  with zero,  3, and  6
percent  annual  productivity  growth  (and  3 percent  interest,  as in the  base
case).
The  ages  at  which  people  enter  and  exit  the  workforce  affects  both  the
level  of the  saving  rate  and  the  strength  of the  effect  of the  demographic
transition,  but reasonable  variation  in  the  assumptions  about  the  life-cycle
of  work effort  do  not  qualitatively  change  the  results  for  the  impact  of the
demographic  transition.  Figure  12  shows  saving  rates  with a labor
participation  rate  of 0.5  for  15-19  year  olds  still  living  with  parents  and
with labor  participation  zero  for  them (the  base  case). With teenagers
working,  parents  can  start  sooner  to  save  for  their  old  age,  but  they  do  not
need to save  as  high share  of income  in their  50s. The  demographic  transition
starts  to  push  saving  rates  up a little  sooner,  and  the  peak  is less
pronounced,  but  there  is  no discernable  impact  in the  steady  state.
Figure  13 shows  the  effects  of assuming  earlier  or later  retirement.
Assuming  fewer  post-retirement  years  means  people  need  to save  less  to support
themselves  then. Varying  the  retirement  age  has  a substantial  effect  on the
level  of the  saving  rate,  but  not  on the  changes  caused  by the  demographic
transition.
A simplifying  assumption  in our  model  was that  all  members  of the
household  consumed  the  same  amount. In fact,  children  in  developing  countries
consume  less  than  adults. Also,  it seems  intuitively  and  empirically  that14
households  everywhere  have  economies  of scale  in  the  sense  that  it  costs  less
to  provide  four  people  a  certain  level  of  welfare  when they  are  living
together  than  when  they  live  separately.  Consequently,  if  the  household  is
trying  to smooth  per  capita  utility  as much  as  possible  over  the  life  cycle,
it  would  reduce  per  capita  consumption  expenditures  when the  household  was
large  (children  still  at home)  in  order  to  save  more for  consumption  when  the
household  is small. These  considerations  would  lower  the  age  at  which
households  stop  consuming  all  labor  income  and  start  to save. In  practice,
however,  the  effect  would  be negligible,  if  there  was at least  moderate  growth
of labor  productivity  and  the  no-borrowing  constraint.  Even  if children
needed  only  half  as  much consumption  as adults  (combining  age  and  economy-of-
scale  effects),  the  age  on the  onset  of saving  in  our  model  would  not change
by  more than  5 years.
Conclusions
The  exercises  reported  here  are  mainly  suggestive  of the  importance  of
the  demographic  factors  for  aggregate  saving  and  macroeconomic  phenomena  in
general. The  demographic  transition  toward  stable  populations  is likely  to
cause  increases  of aggregate  saving  rates  that  would  be important  or.  a
macroeconomic  level. With some  plausible  assumptions,  the  demographically
induced  changes  of saving  rates  would  be comparable  in size  to the  changes
governments  could  hope  to induce  by  policy  changes. Indeed,  policy  changes
would  often  be  necessary  in  order  to get  people  to save  for  their  old  age  as
completely  as is assumed  in  the  simulations.  For  countries  that  have  already
begun  to  experience  declines  of fertility,  increases  of life-cycle  saving
would  come  soon  enough  to  be relevant  for  repaying  debt incurred  in  the  1980s.15
They  would  probably  not,  however,  be the  dominant  force  in  the  determination
of  overall  saving.
Demography  is  crucial  to  long-run  macroeconomic  analysis,  and  the  life-
cycle  household  savinp  relationship  is  only  one  of  many important  links. For
instance,  the  demographic  transitions  would  radically  alter  the  per  capita
labor  f.orce  and  income. Economic  demographers  may  wish to  try  to  model  the
circular  links  from  demography  to saving,  as done  here,  from  saving  to income
growth,  and  from  income  growth  to  saving.16
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